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### THIRD SESSION

Thursday, April 23, 1914, at 8 o'clock p.m.

The Society reassembled at 8:20 o'clock p.m., Rear Admiral CHARLES H. STOCKTON, a member of the Executive Council, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. I am requested to open the proceedings of the evening, which will be, as you will see by the program, addresses on "Misconceptions and Limitations of the Monroe Doctrine." We are to have the pleasure of hearing first on this subject Hon. John W. Foster, ex-Secretary of State.

#### MISCONCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

ADDRESS OF HONORABLE JOHN W. FOSTER,  
*Formerly Secretary of State*

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: The paper which I am about to read was written several days ago, before the occurrence of the events of the last few days in Mexico. I refer to Mexico several times in my paper, but I do not think it will require any amendment of what I have written.

The disorder which has been prevailing in Mexico for some time past and the consequent embarrassment to the Government and people of the United States have given occasion to much misconception as to the functions of the Monroe Doctrine. The fact is that this doctrine has no application to the present conditions in that unfortunate country. Its primary object was and is to prevent the permanent occupation by European nations of any of the territory of the American states or the overthrow of their political institutions. Neither of these matters is involved in the recent or present situation in Mexico.

It is often asserted in the press and by our public men that because, as a result of that doctrine, we do not allow those nations to send a military force into Mexico to protect their subjects and compel a recognition of their just demands, our government must undertake that task for them. But our government has never given such an

interpretation to that doctrine. Succeeding administrations have repeatedly stated that European governments are free to make war upon the American states, or to resort to force to support their complaints, provided they observe the two conditions above stated as to territory and political institutions. Several notable instances may be cited.

In 1864 Spain declared war against Peru and Chile. After receiving assurances from Spain that it had no intention to reamex those republics or to subvert their political system, Secretary Seward, referring to the American states, instructed our ministers that "we concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political or ambitious as it thinks right and wise."<sup>1</sup> In 1860 Secretary Cass informed the French representative in Washington "that the United States did not call in question the right of France to compel the Government of Mexico, by force if necessary, to do it justice."<sup>2</sup> In 1861 the Governments of Great Britain, France and Spain approached the United States with a view to securing its joint action with them in a military expedition to compel Mexico to satisfy their complaints for the murder of their subjects and destruction of their property. The United States declined to unite with them, but Secretary Seward said that the President "did not question that the sovereigns represented have undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against Mexico for redress, and have a right also to levy war severally or jointly."<sup>3</sup> A similar attitude was assumed by the United States when in 1902 the British, German, and Italian Governments sent a naval expedition to Venezuela to enforce the claims of their subjects.<sup>4</sup>

Many other instances may be cited for the forcible interference of European governments with American countries to redress the complaints of their subjects. France in 1838 blockaded the ports of Mexico as an act of redress for unsatisfied demands. In 1842 and in 1844 Great Britain blockaded the ports of Nicaragua, in 1851 the whole coast of Salvador, in 1862-3 seized Brazilian vessels in Brazilian waters as acts of reprisal, and in 1895 resorted to force to bring about a

<sup>1</sup>Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1866, part 2, p. 413.

<sup>2</sup>Manuscript instructions, France, No. 27, Aug. 31, 1860, XV 481, Moore's International Law Digest, p. 480.

<sup>3</sup>House Executive Doc. 100, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 185-187; 52 British & Foreign State Papers, 394.

<sup>4</sup>Dip. Cor. U. S., 1901, p. 195.

settlement of certain demands against Nicaragua.<sup>5</sup> In 1897 a German naval force entered Port-au-Prince and under threat to shell the public buildings forced the Haytian Government to yield immediately to certain demands which the latter claimed were unjust and exorbitant.<sup>6</sup> The bombardment of Valparaiso by the Spaniards, the tripartite military expedition of the British, French, and Spanish in Mexico, and the blockade of Venezuelan ports by the British, Germans and Italians have already been mentioned.

The other misconception as to the functions of the Monroe Doctrine, based upon the false conception that we do not permit force to be used by European governments, is that we must undertake the enforcement of their just claims against Mexico or other disorderly American republics. From the language of that doctrine as announced by President Monroe we can draw no such mandate, and the history of our relations with the American states shows that such a procedure on our part would be unwise, if not impracticable. The position of our government on this phase of the subject has been repeatedly declared. Secretary Sherman, in an instruction to our minister in Hayti respecting the troubles between that country and Germany, wrote:

This government is not under any obligation to become involved in the constantly recurring quarrels of the republics of this hemisphere with other states. The Monroe Doctrine, to which you refer, is wholly inapplicable to the case.<sup>7</sup>

It is likewise a misconception of the doctrine to assert that it is our duty to interfere by force with the administration of the affairs of other American republics, when they fall into anarchy through their oft-recurring revolutions. It has been the uniform policy of our government to observe strict neutrality between the warring factions, and limit the action of our diplomatic, naval, and military representatives to the protection of the lives and property of American citizens. Instances have occurred where it has been charged that their action has resulted in favoring one of the contending parties as against the other. A case of this kind is cited in the action of our naval vessels in 1894 in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, in so interfering with the rebel ships

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<sup>5</sup>6 Moore's Int. Digest, p. 596.

<sup>6</sup>Mss. Inst. Hayti, IV, 23, 6 Moore's Int. Dig., 474.

<sup>7</sup>*Ib.*, 475.

as to favor the republican government of Brazil. Admiral Benham reported that his action was taken solely to protect American shipping and commerce.<sup>8</sup> A more recent case was the landing in Nicaragua of a considerable military force in 1912 during a revolution, and its maintenance ashore for a considerable period after the revolution was suppressed, its object being stated to be for the protection of American residents and their interests. In these or other cases, if our representatives have displayed force in such a way as to favor either faction, it must be regarded as contrary to the policy of our government of a strict neutrality. So far as the conditions in Mexico are concerned, our proximity and the predominance of our industrial and commercial relations furnish occasion for greater interest and supervision on our part than that of any other nation; but the Monroe Doctrine has no place in influencing our action respecting that country.

An appeal is often made to the Monroe Doctrine as a reason for the maintenance of a large and overpowering navy by our country. Mr. Roosevelt when President strongly and repeatedly argued in favor of a rapid increase in our navy as a necessity for maintaining this doctrine. Mr. Taft has more than once declared that the Monroe Doctrine was no stronger than our navy. I venture, against these high authorities, the assertion that neither our history nor the conduct of European governments justify these declarations. If the Monroe Doctrine did not contain a high moral principle of ethics and government which commanded the respect of all civilized nations, we could not build a navy fast enough nor create an army large enough to enforce it against the hostile sentiment of the great Powers of Europe. In 1823, when President Monroe proclaimed in his annual message to Congress the new policy of his administration, our navy was insignificant and would have been impotent as against the armaments of the Holy Alliance. It was the moral tone and reasonableness of the policy that led that Alliance to advise Spain not to challenge it.

The only time in our history when a formidable attempt to disregard the Monroe Doctrine has been made was in the establishment of the so-called Maximilian empire in Mexico during our Civil War. At the close of that war we were in a position to enforce the doctrine, but close students of French politics and government assure us that the French people were so disgusted with Napoleon III for his chimerical scheme and with the unwisdom of disregarding our known policy,

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<sup>8</sup>Dip. Cor. U. S., 1893, pp. 47-140.

that a further attempt to support Maximilian would have resulted in Napoleon's overthrow at home. The sense of justice and fair dealing of the French people condemned him, and a diplomatic note from Secretary Seward was all that was necessary to cause the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico.

The most bold and pronounced assertion of the Monroe Doctrine was Secretary Olney's correspondence and President Cleveland's message on the British-Venezuela territorial question in 1895. The challenge to Great Britain was in the most peremptory terms, and the war fever was instantly awakened on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the navy of the United States was far inferior to that of Great Britain, it did not deter the President from issuing the challenge, nor was the Government of Great Britain controlled in its conduct by the superiority of its armament. It was not prepared to test the strength of its navy on an issue in which the right was so largely on the side of Venezuela, and the British people's rugged view of justice and fair play would not permit its government to enter upon a war in which the issue was so plainly against them. At no time in our history has the weakness of our navy entered as a factor in controlling the action of our government in the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine against the great Powers of the world, nor has this weakness influenced these Powers respecting the doctrine.

It is often asserted that the Monroe Doctrine has no status in international law and therefore cannot be appealed to in our relations with other Powers. It might be retorted that the policy of certain of the European Powers in parceling out and occupying Africa has no warrant in international law, but our government has not seen fit to call the policy in question. The great nations are straining their energies to the utmost to preserve the "Balance of Power" in Europe, but it is a policy which affects us only remotely and we abstain from participation in its control. In his notable message of 1823, President Monroe, in referring to the international affairs on that continent, said that in matters relating to European Powers themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It does not call for incorporation into the accepted code of international law to have the policies of the European continent or the American hemisphere respected or enforced. The fact is, however, that the Monroe Doctrine has been repeatedly recognized and observed by all the great Powers of Europe. A few instances may be cited. In

1861 Great Britain, France and Spain, through their ministers in Washington, addressed a note to Secretary Seward transmitting a copy of a convention in which they agreed to the joint military expedition into Mexico already mentioned, to secure a redress of their grievances, and in which they bound themselves not to seek any acquisition of territory, or to impair the right of the Mexican nation freely to constitute the form of their own government.<sup>9</sup> This was an explicit recognition of the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1901 the Governments of Germany, Great Britain and Italy took steps towards the enforcement of the claims of their subjects against Venezuela. However, before putting their movement into operation, they advised our government of their intentions. The German Ambassador, in a promemoria handed to the Secretary of State, used this language:

We consider it of importance to let first of all the Government of the United States know about our purpose so that we can prove that we have nothing else in view than to help those of our citizens who have suffered damages. \* \* \* We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory.

In his annual message the President, referring to the proposed combined naval operation, said: "The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American Power" He then referred to the "voluntary and friendly declaration of the German Ambassador which was received in the frank and cordial spirit in which it was offered." Similar assurances were given by the British and Italian Ambassadors.<sup>10</sup>

In 1866 it became known that the Austrian Government had concluded a military convention authorizing the levy of troops in Austria to go to Mexico to the support of Maximilian. A protest was directed by Secretary Seward to be made against the expedition, and although a considerable number of troops had been enlisted, when the protest was received, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed our minister that the troops would not be permitted to depart, and they were disbanded.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup>H. Ex. Doc. 100, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 185-187, 6 Moore's Int. Dig., 485.

<sup>10</sup>Dip. Cor. U. S., 1901, p. 194.

<sup>11</sup>6 Moore's Int. Dig., 505.

The foregoing embrace the specific action of six of the great Powers of Europe—Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Italy and Spain,—recognizing the Monroe Doctrine as a policy of the United States to be observed in their relations with this hemisphere. Its incorporation into the code of international law could not make it more effective so far as they are concerned.

Another kindred assertion respecting the Monroe Doctrine is that it has no legal force in the United States because it has never been regularly enacted into a law by the Congress of the United States. It is true that Congress has taken no such action, but both Houses have by separate resolutions declared their emphatic adhesion to the policy, and the succeeding Presidents since Monroe in their messages to Congress have reasserted the declaration issued by him in 1823. It has not been heretofore thought prudent to enact the policy into a formal statement by Congress, because, as expressed in a resolution adopted by the House in 1826, "the people of the United States should be left free to act, in any crisis in such a manner as their feelings of friendship towards these republics, and as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate."<sup>12</sup> But our government in 1899 took the most positive and solemn action respecting the Monroe Doctrine. In the full session of the Hague Peace Conference, in signifying their adhesion to the Peace Convention, the delegates from the United States made this public declaration: That nothing contained in the said convention shall be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions.<sup>13</sup> This declaration was received without a single dissent from any delegate. It was incorporated into the convention as a part of the treaty, as such was ratified by the Senate of the United States, and is now a part of the public law of the nation. A more formal and solemn assertion by the law-making power could hardly be made.

We have heard of late some suggestion that the doctrine should be abandoned for various reasons. It is alleged that it is unpopular in the larger states of South America and that we are looked upon with suspicion by Latin America. It is true that the growth of something like imperial power and prosperity of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile largely removes the possible occasion for the assertion of the doctrine

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<sup>12</sup>6 Moore's Int. Dig., 420.

<sup>13</sup>Report of the United States Commission, July 31, 1899, Holls, Peace Conference at The Hague, 477. 531; Compilation of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 921.



in that part of the hemisphere; and also that manifestations of unfriendliness or dictatorial action on the part of some of our officials have occasioned resentment in Latin America; but there exists no valid reason for the abandonment of the doctrine on our part. Since the construction of the Panama Canal its maintenance has been increased in importance, and it was never more essential to our safety than today. A few years ago Professor Munsterberg, of Harvard University, issued a fulmination against its wisdom and good policy which attracted passing notice<sup>14</sup>; and of late there has been a recrudescence of academic learning upon the subject. Rarely does a man of public affairs utter such views. As against the professors, I would give the utterances of two of the greatest statesmen and patriots our country has produced, and their words are as appropriate today as when uttered. Daniel Webster in the the Senate said: "I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to erase it nor tear it out; nor shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted." I quote the words of Grover Cleveland in his Venezuelan message of 1895: "It was intended to apply to every stage of our national existence."

The CHAIRMAN. The next speaker is Dr. Leo S. Rowe, Professor of Political Science in the University of Pennsylvania.

## MISCONCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

ADDRESS OF LEO S. ROWE,

*Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania*

The time at my disposal makes it impossible to enter into an examination of the historical circumstances that led to the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine or to discuss the conditions that accompanied its development. Furthermore, in view of the wealth of material that has been presented at the sessions of yesterday and today, such a discussion would probably be superfluous.

With reference to the present scope and limits of the Monroe Doctrine, we are confronted with an extraordinary situation. Throughout the countries of Central and South America there is a deeply

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<sup>14</sup>6 Moore's Int. Dig., 528.

rooted belief that the United States is using the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak behind which there lurk designs against their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In the countries of continental Europe, which a few years ago seemed to be moving toward a tacit acquiescence, if not a willing acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine, there is noticeable a rekindling of the opposition which marked their earlier attitude—a feeling of sullen resentment against what is regarded as the presumptuousness of the United States in declaring a kind of protectorate over the republics of the American continent.

Finally, as a further complicating factor, adding in no small measure to the difficulties of the situation, we find a movement, led by men whose judgment is entitled to most serious consideration, favoring either the complete abandonment of the doctrine, or its transformation into a Pan-American Doctrine. We are told:

First. That the conditions which justified the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 have so changed that those principles are no longer applicable to modern conditions. The advance of constitutional government, it is contended, has brought the political institutions of Europe into closer relations with those of America, so that today individual liberty and personal rights are more completely guaranteed in most of the countries of Europe than in many parts of the American continent. The contrast between European and American institutions can no longer be made the basis of the foreign policy of the United States, and the Monroe Doctrine, as a means of protecting free institutions on the American continent, has, therefore, lost its reason for existence.

Second. That the interpretations of the doctrine subsequent to its formulation in 1823, have gone far beyond the original intent, and that under the guise of a political catchword we are gradually approaching the assertion of the paramountcy and the hegemony of the United States on the American continent.

Third. That these extensions of the doctrine have aroused the opposition of the countries for whose benefit it was originally formulated, and that many of the countries of Central and South America are at the present time opposed to it. In fact, the feeling against the doctrine is more pronounced in Central and South America than in the countries of continental Europe.

Finally, that the continued maintenance of the doctrine will gradually place us in a position of complete isolation. Although European governments have seemingly acquiesced, it must not be supposed that they regard it with a friendly eye. The continued assertion of the doctrine will, we are told, alienate the sympathies of all the countries of the American continent as well as the countries of continental Europe.

The serious nature of this indictment makes it a matter both of national and international importance to subject the issues involved to the closest possible scrutiny, with a view to ascertaining whether the Monroe Doctrine, in whole or in part, continues to subserve our national interests, or whether it has become a stumbling block to the development of closer relations between the United States and the republics of the American continent.

We have had pointed out to us time and again that the words "Monroe Doctrine" have cast a kind of spell over the American people, and that the emotional reaction to which these words give rise has precluded and still precludes a calm, dispassionate consideration of our international relations. The history of the successive appeals to the doctrine lends considerable support to this criticism. That the situation involves serious dangers is demonstrated by the fact that on several occasions an emotional appeal has been made to the people of the United States under the guise of the Monroe Doctrine, when as a matter of fact the principles of the doctrine were but remotely involved.

If we are ever to develop a positive, constructive American foreign policy, it is necessary that a definite content be given to the term "Monroe Doctrine." This does not mean that the entire foreign policy of the United States should be limited to the Monroe Doctrine; in fact, the purpose in view is exactly the contrary. The precise content of the Monroe Doctrine once determined, we are then prepared to reach some conclusion as to whether these principles should be upheld or abandoned. Such further principles of American foreign policy as the welfare of the country may demand should be formulated, not as parts of the Monroe Doctrine, but as distinct additional principles of a constructive American foreign policy.

It is hardly necessary in this presence to refer to the fact that the Monroe Doctrine at the time of its formulation contained but two principles:

First. A declaration against further European colonization on the American continent.

Second. A declaration against an attempt on the part of any European Power to control the form of government or the political destinies of the republics of the American continent.

The first principle, namely, the declaration against further colonization, is no longer applicable to conditions now existing on the American continent. This declaration was intended to prevent the acquisition of further territory by European nations through the process of "discovery and settlement." Now that all the territory on the American continent is under the dominion of independent nations, there is no longer any possibility of acquisition by discovery and settlement, except in the regions immediately adjoining the North and South Poles. In fact, all the dangers which the message of President Monroe was intended to guard against are fully met by the second principle, namely, the declaration against the attempt on the part of an European Power to control the form of government or the political destinies of any American state.

While the two principles which constituted the original doctrine were undoubtedly intended and did serve to protect the interests of the republics of Central and South America, the fundamental purpose of the declaration was one of national self-protection. There is no doubt that the enthusiasm of the people of the United States was aroused by the fact that the doctrine served to protect the republics of the American continent against European aggression, but the primary purpose of the framers of the doctrine was to assure the national safety and unhampered development of the United States. Deep sympathy with the republics of Central and South America undoubtedly accompanied this primary purpose. The Congress of the United States, led by men like Henry Clay, expressed its enthusiasm for the new-born republics in no uncertain terms. Nevertheless, in the minds of its framers, the Monroe Doctrine was primarily a principle of national self-protection. It is well to emphasize this point because of the fact that it gives to the doctrine a permanency and a vitality independent of the will and independent of the attitude of the countries for whose benefit it was originally formulated.

The Government of the United States, from the time of the founding of the Republic, was conscious of all the difficulties resulting from

the rivalry of European interests on the American continent, and the cardinal principle of our foreign policy was to free the country from the complications which would necessarily ensue from such rivalries. It is true that the conditions of today are totally different from those that confronted President Monroe in 1823. At that time he and his cabinet were formulating a principle, which, as has been well said by Admiral Mahan, was a declaration of independence, not merely of one country, namely, the United States, but of an entire continent. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the declaration was formulated primarily in the interests of the United States.

If we approach the situation from this viewpoint, it is not difficult to see that the doctrine of national self-protection is quite as vital today as it was in 1823. It is said that no European country desires any territory, or desires to extend its influence on the American continent. We must rid ourselves of the idea that the extension of influence or the extension of actual territorial dominion necessarily involves any elements of moral turpitude. On the contrary, such extensions represent a perfectly natural desire; a desire which gives evidence of national vigor and national growth. With a tremendous territory but sparsely settled it is inevitable that the Great Powers of Europe should regard Central and South America as a possible field for national expansion. The settled purpose of the American people, to keep the American continent free from the complications of European territorial rivalries, is just as definite and quite as necessary today as it was in 1823.

So far as the declaration against European control is concerned, there can not be the slightest objection to inviting the countries of Central and South America to coöperate with us in its maintenance. In this sense it is entirely possible as well as desirable to make the doctrine continental or Pan-American, provided we do not lose sight of the fact that in making it "Pan-American" we do not relinquish the right to maintain it, independent of the will of any of the other Powers of the American continent. The doctrine will be strengthened by reason of continental support, but we must not permit it to be weakened by continental indifference or opposition. In transforming the doctrine into a principle of continental significance we neither abandon it nor condemn it as an obsolete shibboleth.

Whether we give to the doctrine a continental status or not, it is a

matter of vital importance to our position amongst the nations, that new principles of our foreign policy should not masquerade as integral parts of the doctrine but should be formulated and maintained as positive principles supplementing its negative prohibitions.

What is the nature of these constructive, positive principles that should supplement the Monroe Doctrine? We will do well in this respect to profit by the example and experience of the great nations of western civilization, especially Great Britain, Germany and France, which, while adopting certain general principles, in many respects similar to our Monroe Doctrine, have carefully adapted the details of their foreign policy to the special needs and circumstances confronting them in their relations with different sections of the world. Germany does not content herself with the negative principles of a European balance of power. She has formulated a positive foreign policy in the Mediterranean, in Asia Minor, in China and in Africa. In precisely the same way we must develop constructive principles, not only in our relations with the Near and the Far East but with the different sections of the American continent.

As a first step toward this end, it is important to supplement the negative prohibition of the Monroe Doctrine with positive constructive principles that will govern us in defining our attitude toward each one of a group of continental problems. This involves the development of first, a Mexican policy; secondly, a Caribbean policy; thirdly, a Central-American policy; fourthly, a policy with reference to each of the countries of South America.

Our relations with Mexico, with Central America and with the islands of the Caribbean, present certain common characteristics which call for the application of exceptional principles in the adjustment of our relations with these sections of the American continent. The concept of national sovereignty has undergone many changes during the last century. It is true that our modern system of international law rests on this principle, and there is no doubt that it marked a healthful reaction against the claims of universal dominion of the Holy Roman Empire. Useful as it has been in developing a respect for the rights of weaker states, the solidarity of interests of certain groups of nations of western civilization has begun to make serious inroads upon the idea of national sovereignty and independence. The growth of the European Concert, the interests of certain temporary or permanent

groupings, such as the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, all represent forces that have profoundly influenced and modified the doctrine of national sovereignty in international affairs.

Slowly, in many cases unconsciously, and in all cases without full recognition of the consequences involved, changes of a like nature have been taking place in international relations on the American continent. It is true that our national thought has not kept pace with the actual changes in international conditions, due to the fact that the foreign policy of the United States has been of a negative rather than of a positive character. Fundamental physical and economic facts have begun to make their influence felt in the development of relations more positive and constructive than those implied in the Monroe Doctrine. As was recently pointed out by an eminent economist, the maintenance and improvement of the standard of living of the American workingman depend, in part, on an uninterrupted supply of tropical products from the West Indies and from Central America. The reduction of the price of meat, or at least, the avoidance of an increasing cost, will depend in large measure upon the development of the cattle ranges of northern Mexico. Our great manufacturing interests look to an increasing extent to the vast mining resources of our southern neighbors.

In short, national economic interests of a basic character, affecting the welfare, the standard of life and the industrial prosperity of our country, are inextricably bound up with the political stability and the economic progress of Mexico, Central America and the West Indies. When we add to these fundamental economic and social interests, considerations of a strategic nature, the vital relation of these sections of the American continent to the United States immediately becomes apparent. The acquisition of the Canal Zone has made of the United States a Central American as well as a North American Power, and our national policy must hereafter be profoundly influenced by this change in our geographical relations.

We are interested in the welfare of Mexico, of Central America and of the West Indies primarily because their stability and their progress intimately affect the well-being of our own people, and we are interested in their attitude toward us because that attitude has a distinct bearing on our national safety. This essential solidarity of interests carries with it as a logical and inevitable consequence a limitation on the freedom of action of all the parties concerned.

Approaching the question from the broadest possible point of view, we are forced to the conclusion that national sovereignty is limited and modified by the larger interests of continental progress. Looking at the situation exclusively from the point of view of the national self-protection of the United States, it is evident that, irrespective of any question of European interference, we can not remain indifferent to, and in the long run can not tolerate, the continued existence of disorder or instability in any part of Central America, in Mexico or in the West Indies. This, therefore, is the larger and basic problem which calls for the development of a positive American foreign policy.

In addition to these considerations of a general character, there are certain special circumstances that place us in an exceptional relationship to Mexico. The fact that Mexico is our neighbor, that over fifty thousand American citizens are resident in the republic, and that vast American interests amounting to over a billion dollars are at stake, place the country in a position totally different from that of any of the countries of South America. Everything that affects the peace, the welfare and the progress of Mexico is of interest to the United States. We can no more remain indifferent to the continued existence of disorder and anarchy in Mexico than we could have remained indifferent to those conditions when they existed in Cuba. The requirements of national self-protection, the fulfillment of our obligations to Americans resident in Mexico, the performance of our duty in protecting the vast interests which our citizens have at stake in that country, and, finally, our larger obligations to the interests of western civilization, make it incumbent upon us to do everything in our power to preserve the primary requisites for the continued existence and development of Mexican civilization.

In dealing with this Indian nation, we must recognize the basic facts of Mexican political life, namely, that she is living under a constitution which is out of harmony with the political needs and capacity of the people; a constitution which is, therefore, unworkable, and that her primary needs are of an economic and social rather than of a political nature. The development of a small land-holding class, the raising of the standard of life of her industrial, mining and agricultural workers and the protection of the entire laboring population against exploitation will do more toward preparing the way for the development of democratic rule in Mexico than any amount of outside dictation as to



the particular type of government under which the Mexican people shall live.

As regards the islands of the Caribbean, it is evident that their close proximity to our southern coast and their strategic importance as outposts of the route to the Panama Canal give to them an exceptional importance, and that our national safety and well-being demand that they should not become involved in conflicts with European countries, conflicts which might result in the loss of their independence.

It was not necessary to invoke the Monroe Doctrine to justify the position taken by the United States in 1905 with reference to Santo Domingo. The same fundamental considerations upon which the Monroe Doctrine itself rests, namely, those of national self-protection, explain and justify our San Domingan policy.

As regards Central America, the acquisition of the Canal Zone makes the United States a Central American Power. Anarchy or continued disorder in any of the countries of that section of the American Continent vitally affects our own national safety. In contributing within the measure of our power toward their prosperity and orderly development we are at the same time fostering the permanent interests of the United States. The considerations which apply to the countries of Central America apply with equal force, because of their geographical situation, to Colombia and Venezuela.

When we come to consider our relations with the countries of South America (excluding Colombia and Venezuela) a totally different situation presents itself. During recent years there has been much talk about the development of a "Latin American" policy. The abandonment of this idea represents the first step toward the adjustment of our foreign policy to the real rather than the imaginary conditions existing in South America. Our relation with each of the countries of the southern hemisphere involves a different and distinct group of problems. The adjustment of the relations between the Argentine Republic and the United States must be based not upon any general considerations relating to South America as a whole, but upon the special conditions prevailing in the Argentine Republic, and similarly with the other countries.

In South America we find developing a series of international problems of the most difficult and delicate nature; problems which may in time endanger the peace of that section of the American continent.

While our interest in the maintenance of peace in and between the republics of South America is different, both in kind and in degree, from our interest in the maintenance of order in Mexico and in some of the countries of Central America, we are none the less called upon to contribute within the measure of our influence toward the maintenance of the "*Pax Americana*" in the larger sense, because its disturbance involves a menace to the independence of these countries. The cardinal principle of our foreign policy with the countries of South America must be to contribute within the measure of our power toward the settlement of pending questions without conflict. In the execution of this purpose, there is the possibility of developing an American Concert similar in some respects, but far more effective, than the action of the European Concert.

It is, furthermore, important to bear in mind that in South America there are a number of small states whose permanent relations to their neighbors have not as yet been definitely established. The rivalry for influence over such states as Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay is a constant menace to the peace of the southern hemisphere. The fact that the United States can view this situation impartially, will enable our government to exercise an important if not a determining influence in the maintenance of peace, in the preservation of existing territorial relations, and in bringing about the peaceful settlement of present and future disputes. Through such a concert of Powers, which should include the Argentine Republic, Chile, Brazil, Peru and the United States, the relations between the republics will be treated as a matter of continental interest and importance. With this adjustment, the Monroe Doctrine has little or nothing to do. We have an interest in the settlement of the controversy regarding the jurisdiction over the River Plate in that it should not become the cause of a continental conflagration; we have an interest that the position of Paraguay should not lead to armed conflict amongst those of her neighbors who are now engaged in a more or less friendly rivalry for the extension of control over Paraguayan policy.

In the accomplishment of these purposes, which at the same time serve the interests of world peace, our interests run parallel with those of the great countries of South America, and we should, therefore, move not only in harmony but in active and helpful coöperation with them. The development of such a policy, as well as its ultimate suc-

cess, depends on the possibility of allaying the fears of the republics of South America with reference to the motives and ultimate purposes of the United States. Mere personal assurances will have but little effect. The only way in which we can hope to allay those feelings is through closer personal ties, closer intellectual and cultural relations with the peoples of these countries. As their acquaintance with the people of the United States grows in breadth and depth, and as we learn to respect the dignity and value of the civilization represented by the leading countries of South America, there will develop a feeling of mutual confidence which will make it easier for the official relations of the governments to be determined by that spirit of co-operation without which a truly continental policy is impossible. Until that better understanding and better appreciation of motives, intents and purposes can be established, it will be exceedingly difficult to allay the distrust which now exists.

We have seen that the Monroe Doctrine at the time of its formulation was not a new principle in American foreign policy; it was simply the application to two concrete international problems of those fundamental principles of national self-protection which are of universal application, and which have found expression in the European doctrine of the balance of power, and in the action of the European Concert. This principle of national self-protection, which forbids further European colonization on the American continent, and which prohibits European countries from making any attempt either to overthrow or control the destinies of American states, is quite as vital today as it was ninety years ago. The real danger of the present situation is due to the vague and indefinite thinking that has characterized the attitude of the American people toward the Monroe Doctrine.

One of the most profound students of American political institutions<sup>1</sup> has referred to the Monroe Doctrine as one of the fetiches of the American people, and one of the keenest of foreign observers<sup>2</sup> has said of it that it casts a spell over the national thought of the people of the United States, a spell which allows emotion rather than sober reason to dominate the public mind.

In a democracy such as ours, there is real danger in such a situation,

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<sup>1</sup>Professor Burgess.

<sup>2</sup>A. M. Low.

a danger which arises from the fact that such an emotional attitude always affords the opportunity to unscrupulous or incompetent political leaders to exploit these emotions for purposes that are not consonant with the permanent interests of the country. There have been a number of attempts in the course of our national history to use the Monroe Doctrine as a shield for ulterior ends intended to promote sectional rather than national interests. When the British-North American Act, which united the Dominion of Canada, was under consideration, the attempt was made to arouse American opposition to the measure on the ground that it was out of harmony with the Monroe Doctrine. It would be difficult to imagine a more unwarranted abuse of the real principle of the doctrine.

The question which presents itself to the American people, therefore, is not whether the Monroe Doctrine should be abandoned, but rather whether it is safe for a great world Power like the United States to use a political catchword as an all-inclusive principle of foreign policy rather than meet each new international situation as it arises with principles which appeal to the sober judgment of the American people. An emotional response to a political catchword can never become the basis of a sound foreign policy. President Wilson has well said that the questions of the day are not "mere questions of policy and diplomacy, they are shot through with principles of life." This profound truth means that the foreign policy of the United States must become as much a matter of national thought as the principles that are to govern the solution of our domestic questions.

If, therefore, we are to continue the use of the term "Monroe Doctrine," let us confine it to the one great principle for which it today stands. Whatever principles we may find it necessary to add, let us recognize them frankly as new principles of American foreign policy, to be justified on the basis of imperative national interests or of manifest international obligations.

I firmly believe that it would tend to clarify the national thought of the American people if we were to abandon the use of the term "Monroe Doctrine," at the same time stating in no uncertain language that the principle that "no European Power shall control the form of government or the political destinies of an American state" is as vital an element of our national policy as it was in 1823. This would mean that any additional principles of our foreign policy that might

be formulated would not masquerade under the assumed name of the Monroe Doctrine, but would be clearly recognized as constituent parts of a constructive American foreign policy. Such a plan would have the further advantage of allaying the uncertainty which exists in the countries of Central and South America as to the content of the Monroe Doctrine and the ulterior purposes of the United States.

We are told by no less an authority than the Lord High Chancellor of England (Lord Haldane), that the Monroe Doctrine involves a necessary corollary that the United States will assume the responsibility for good government and fair treatment for the smaller nations of the Western Hemisphere. This may or may not become a principle of American foreign policy, but whatever the future may have in store, let us clearly recognize the fact that such a principle is no part of the Monroe Doctrine, and that it must, therefore, be discussed and justified by reasoning extraneous to the doctrine.

Another distinguished observer of American institutions tells us that the Monroe Doctrine involves a duty on the part of the United States "not only to protect the political entity of Latin America, but also to preserve its financial independence; to save it from its own weakness, to protect it from becoming a victim of concessionaires, whether they be American or European; to enable Latin America to develop itself without selling itself into bondage; to encourage Latin America to respect itself, so that it may have the respect of the whole world." Here again we have a series of principles which are new to American foreign policy and are but remotely related to the Monroe Doctrine. They must not be permitted to masquerade under an assumed name.

A few months ago, in an address delivered before the Southern Commercial Congress, the President of the United States took a similar position. In formulating a new principle of American foreign policy, the purpose which he seems to have in view is the gradual financial emancipation of the countries of Central and South America from their present dependence on European capital. In the course of this address, the President attacked "the material interests that had influenced the foreign policy of certain governments in their relations with the nations of Latin America." He declared it to be the duty of the United States, "to assist the nations of this hemisphere in their emancipation from the material interests of other nations, so that they might enjoy constitutional liberty unrestrained." "You hear," he said,

"of concessions to foreign capital in Latin America. \* \* \* States that are obliged to grant concessions are in the position that foreign interests are apt to dominate their affairs. Such a state of things is apt to become intolerable. It is emancipation from this inevitable subordination that we deem it our duty to assist."

It is true that the President restricted himself to a declaration against "concessions," and it would seem that to his mind this term involves the idea of special privilege or monopoly. The nearest equivalent of the Spanish word "*concesión*" is our own legal term "franchise." It is true, that in many of the countries of Central and South America such franchises include the grant of monopolistic privileges. It is also true that under the cloak of such franchises many abuses have been committed, but we must bear in mind that the unsettled political conditions prevailing in many of these countries and the exceptional risks to which foreign capital is subjected have made it necessary to offer exceptional inducements in order to attract foreign investors. If we stop to reflect on the extraordinary inducements which were offered to foreign capital during the early history of the United States, and on the great service which such capital rendered to our national development, we can readily see that any policy the effect of which is to discourage foreign investments in Central and South America can not help but retard the development of those sections of the continent. We may deplore the fact that in many of the republics of the American continent there has been a wasteful and at times a corrupt distribution of franchises and special privileges, but is it either our duty or our right to determine or even to suggest the standards to which the investment of foreign capital shall conform?

At all events, let us not close our eyes to the fact that the formulation of this policy has aroused serious misgivings throughout the countries of the American continent, as it is looked upon as an unwarranted assumption of control over their liberty of action. In Europe the President's pronouncement is regarded as confirmatory of a suspicion, which has been growing within recent years, namely, that the United States has embarked upon a national policy, the purpose of which is to reserve the less advanced countries of this continent for the economic exploitation of American capital.

Whatever the ultimate judgment on the appropriateness of the principles or the wisdom of the policy formulated in the President's Mobile

speech, it should be made clear that this new orientation of our foreign policy is not a part of the Monroe Doctrine, and has no organic relation to the fundamental principle upon which the Monroe Doctrine rests, namely, national safety and self-protection. It is a new and strange principle which has aroused the opposition of the countries for whose benefit it is intended, and has engendered bitterness of feeling amongst European peoples. If it is to be maintained, it must justify itself by basic reasons of national interest and international obligation entirely independent of the Monroe Doctrine.

Permit me in closing to summarize briefly the position which I have taken with reference to the Monroe Doctrine in its relation to American foreign policy:

1. The Monroe Doctrine, while based on a well recognized principle of international law, namely, the right of self-protection, is itself not a part of international law, nor have we the slightest interest in having it so recognized.

2. The Monroe Doctrine, as such, consisted of but two principles; a declaration against further European colonization, and a declaration against European control of existing American states. The first principle is no longer applicable, because of the fact that the occupation of the territory of the American continent by independent nations has made further colonization impossible; the second is as vital to our national safety and well-being today as it was ninety years ago. It implies no hostility toward European countries, but simply embodies the results of accumulated experience, namely, the unwisdom of permitting the American continent to become the theater of European rivalries.

3. We should never permit the Monroe Doctrine to become a cloak, behind which any country may take refuge for the purpose of escaping the consequences of its wrong-doing. European countries should be given a free hand in pursuing the remedies recognized by international law for the redress of grievances, but, as President Roosevelt said, such remedies should not be permitted to assume the form of a permanent occupancy of American territory, or permanent control of the destinies of an American state.

4. Where the conditions are such that the only effective remedy involves the danger of such control, the United States is justified, entirely independent of the Monroe Doctrine, to pursue the course

followed with reference to Santo Domingo in 1905, which was in effect the reorganization, under American auspices, of the finances of that country, and the lending of our aid and support in the administration of its revenues. All these steps were taken, mainly, for the benefit of European creditors.

5. Neither the Monroe doctrine nor any additional valid principle of our foreign policy justifies the assumption of responsibility either for the fair treatment of Europeans, resident in the countries of Central or South America, or for the maintenance of the financial independence of these countries.

By reason of peculiarly favorable circumstances, we have become the leading nation of the Western Hemisphere in population, wealth and power, but the fact of such a position involves the necessity of forbearance and self-control in order that such power shall not be abused.

6. We must abandon the idea of developing a "Latin-American policy." The general principles of 1823 were applicable to all parts of Spanish and Portuguese America at a time when the newly established republics presented many common characteristics. A century's growth, however, has so differentiated these countries that the United States must now develop its relations toward each of them with the same care and discrimination that Great Britain exercises in its relations with the countries of continental Europe. As we have seen, a policy adapted to Mexico is inapplicable to the Argentine, Brazil, Chile or Peru, and a policy which is necessary in dealing with Nicaragua or Colombia is inapplicable to Guatemala or Salvador.

Nothing is more distasteful to the more advanced countries of South America than to hear the President of the United States speak of a "Latin-American policy." Nothing offends them more deeply than when the government of the United States attempts to admonish the Latin-American countries as if they were all in the same category.

7. The rapid development of the leading countries of Latin America, especially the Argentine, Chile, Brazil and Peru, has prepared the way for the development of an American Concert, which can be far more effective in its action than the European Concert. The pending international problems of South America can best be solved by coöperation of the United States with these four Powers. The sooner we prepare for such concerted action the better will we be able to serve the cause



of peace and good will on the American continent. In order to prepare for such action, we must cultivate closer intellectual and cultural ties with the countries of Central and South America. Only through such means will they secure a clearer understanding of the point of view of the people of the United States, and will we be able to appreciate more fully their aspirations and ideals.

8. Finally, it is evident that the United States can exert its greatest and highest influence on the American continent by the force of its example rather than by any self-constituted guardianship. Let us see to it that every treaty entered into by the United States is faithfully observed. Our present reputation amongst the nations is that of a country prone to a narrow and technical interpretation of treaty obligations. Our failure at critical periods to fulfil our full duty toward foreigners resident within our borders, the helplessness of the national government to give adequate redress for injuries to foreigners caused by mob violence, the attempt at a highly technical interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, have made a painful impression throughout the civilized world. A due regard for the sanctity of these obligations, and a firm determination carefully to observe the rights of the weakest as well as the most powerful nations with which we may be brought into contact,—these are the principles which will give to this country a real position of leadership, and will enable it to secure the good will and active coöperation of the countries of Central and South America.

With the Monroe Doctrine limited to the principle which today remains a vital one, with a constructive foreign policy dealing with every country in accordance with its needs and our own national requirements, and with a position of leadership assured by our example rather than by our military or naval force, we will best accomplish the two-fold purpose which our foreign policy must ever have in view,—the protection of our national interests and the promotion of the peace and progress of the entire American continent.

The CHAIRMAN. The next speaker on the program is Mr. Eugene Wambaugh, Professor of International Law, Harvard Law School.

Mr. WAMBAUGH. Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: This is the eighth of a series of papers on the Monroe Doctrine. Necessarily

there is much repetition. As far as practicable, repetitions have been eliminated from this paper of mine. The result is that the paper is not complete. Very possibly the result also is that it is incoherent. If any one is especially interested in my line of thought, he should look at the printed proceedings of the Society. And yet, though what I have to say is somewhat dilapidated for the reasons which I have mentioned, I trust that enough remains to make it perfectly clear that I believe in the Monroe Doctrine, every word of it, every letter of it, all the punctuation marks, and also that if a scare-head were placed over my paper—and just now we are a trifle too well acquainted with scare-heads—that scare-head would say, “The Monroe Doctrine: A Gospel of Peace.”

## THE MONROE DOCTRINE—A GOSPEL OF PEACE

ADDRESS OF EUGENE WAMBAUGH,  
*Professor in the Law School of Harvard University*

In most parts of the United States one seldom sees a camp, a fort, a cannon, or even a soldier.

There are countries of which this can not be said.

The difference can be made clear by statistics.

The population of the German Empire in 1910 was slightly under sixty-five million; and in 1912 the peace establishment of the army and navy, excluding all reserves, amounted to six hundred and eighty-nine thousand, or a trifle over one per cent of the population.

The population of France in 1911 was slightly under forty million; and in 1913 the peace establishment of the army and navy, excluding reserves and excluding men serving in Algiers, amounted to five hundred and ninety-six thousand, or almost exactly one and one-half per cent.

In 1910 the population of the United States was almost ninety-two million; and hence, if the average of the German and French figures—one and one-quarter per cent—had been the measure of our military establishment, the number of men in the army and navy would have been about one million three hundred and eighty thousand; but, as in 1912 the army and navy, excluding about 6,000 provisional troops in the Philippines, and including about the same number of naval militia, amounted to fewer than one hundred and forty thousand, the